Arbeitspapier

Does Decentralization of Decisions Increase the Stability of Large Groups?

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Using a laboratory experiment with nested local and global public goods, we analyze the stability of global groups when individuals have the option to separate, according to the degree of decentralization of decision-making. We show that increasing the number of decisions made at the local level within a smaller group reduces the likelihood that individuals vote in favor of a break-up of the global group. Voting for a break-up of the global group is more likely when global group members are less cooperative and local group members are more cooperative. Reinforcing local group identity has no impact on votes.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 11364

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
Thema
break-up of groups
decision rights
voting behavior
public goods
experiment

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Bjedov, Tjaša
Lapointe, Simon
Madies, Thierry
Villeval, Marie Claire
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2018

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Bjedov, Tjaša
  • Lapointe, Simon
  • Madies, Thierry
  • Villeval, Marie Claire
  • Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2018

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