Learning to Like What You Have

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Location: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main

Extent: Online-Ressource

Language: Englisch

Notes: In: Sonderforschungsbereich 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, Band 1997, Ausgabe 38, 1997

Classification: Wirtschaft

Event: Veröffentlichung

(where): Berlin

(who): Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin

(when): 1997

Creator: Huck, Steffen
Kirchsteiger, Georg
Oechssler, Joerg

DOI: 10.18452/3818

URN: urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10064208

Rights: Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.

Last update: 14.08.2025, 11:01 AM CEST

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Huck, Steffen
Kirchsteiger, Georg
Oechssler, Joerg
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin

Time of origin

1997

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Learning to Like What You Have

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Other Objects (12)

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