Arbeitspapier

Inconsistent time preferences and on-the-job search: When it pays to be naive

We study optimal employment contracts for present-biased employees who can conduct on-the-job search. Presuming that fims cannot offer long-term contracts, we find that individuals who are naive about their present bias will actually be better off than sophisticated or time-consistent individuals. Moreover, they search more, which partially counteracts the ineffciencies caused by their present bias.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 1909

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Firm Behavior: Theory
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: General‡
Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Retirement Plans; Private Pensions
Thema
Present bias
on-the-job search

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Fahn, Matthias
Seibel, Regina
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Johannes Kepler University of Linz, Department of Economics
(wo)
Linz
(wann)
2019

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Fahn, Matthias
  • Seibel, Regina
  • Johannes Kepler University of Linz, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2019

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