Arbeitspapier
Inconsistent time preferences and on-the-job search: When it pays to be naive
We study optimal employment contracts for present-biased employees who can conduct on-the-job search. Presuming that fims cannot offer long-term contracts, we find that individuals who are naive about their present bias will actually be better off than sophisticated or time-consistent individuals. Moreover, they search more, which partially counteracts the ineffciencies caused by their present bias.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 1909
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Firm Behavior: Theory
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: General‡
Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Retirement Plans; Private Pensions
- Thema
-
Present bias
on-the-job search
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Fahn, Matthias
Seibel, Regina
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Johannes Kepler University of Linz, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Linz
- (wann)
-
2019
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Fahn, Matthias
- Seibel, Regina
- Johannes Kepler University of Linz, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2019