Arbeitspapier
Inconsistent time preferences and on-the-job search: When it pays to be naive
We study optimal employment contracts for present-biased employees who can conduct on-the-job search. Presuming that fims cannot offer long-term contracts, we find that individuals who are naive about their present bias will actually be better off than sophisticated or time-consistent individuals. Moreover, they search more, which partially counteracts the ineffciencies caused by their present bias.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 1909
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Firm Behavior: Theory
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: General‡
Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Retirement Plans; Private Pensions
- Subject
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Present bias
on-the-job search
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Fahn, Matthias
Seibel, Regina
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Johannes Kepler University of Linz, Department of Economics
- (where)
-
Linz
- (when)
-
2019
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Fahn, Matthias
- Seibel, Regina
- Johannes Kepler University of Linz, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2019
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