Arbeitspapier

Regular prices and sales

We study the properties of a profit-maximizing monopolist's optimal price distribution when selling to a loss-averse consumer, where (following Koszegi and Rabin (2006)) we assume that the consumer's reference point is her recent rational expectations about the purchase. If it is close to costless for the consumer to observe the realized price of the product, then – in a pattern consistent with several recently documented facts regarding supermarket pricing – the monopolist chooses low and variable “sale” prices with some probability and a high and sticky “regular” price with the complementary probability. Realizing that she will buy at the sale prices and hence that she will purchase with positive probability, the consumer chooses to avoid the painful uncertainty in whether she will get the product by buying also at the regular price. If it is more costly for the consumer to observe the realized price, then – in a pattern consistent with the pricing behavior of some other retailers (e.g. movie theaters) – the monopolist chooses a sticky price and holds no sales. In this case, a sale is less tempting and hence less effective in generating an expectation to purchase with positive probability. We also show that ex-ante competition for loyal consumers leads to sticky pricing while ex-post competition leads to marginal-cost pricing, and discuss several other extensions of the model.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ESMT Working Paper ; No. 10-008

Klassifikation
Management
Consumer Economics: Theory
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Thema
reference-dependent utility
gain-loss utility
loss aversion
sticky prices
sales
supermarket pricing
Einzelhandelspreispolitik
Preisdifferenzierung
Preisrigidität
Konsumentenverhalten
Preistheorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Heidhues, Paul
Koszegi, Botond
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
European School of Management and Technology (ESMT)
(wo)
Berlin
(wann)
2010

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:101:1-201106143726
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Heidhues, Paul
  • Koszegi, Botond
  • European School of Management and Technology (ESMT)

Entstanden

  • 2010

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