Optimal bid disclosure in license auctions with downstream interaction

Arbeitspapier

The literature on license auctions for process innovations in oligopoly assumed that the auctioneer reveals the winning bid and stressed that this gives firms an incentive to signal strength through their bids, to the benefit of the innovator. In the present paper we examine whether revealing the winning bid is optimal. We consider three disclosure rules: full, partial, and no disclosure of bids, which correspond to standard auctions. We show that more information disclosure increases the total surplus divided between firms and the innovator as well as social surplus. More disclosure also increases bidders' payoff. However, no disclosure maximizes the innovator's expected revenue.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 467

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Firm Behavior: Theory ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Auctions ; Rationing; Licensing
• Subject: Auctions ; innovation ; licensing ; information sharing

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Fan, Cuihong ; Jun, Byoung Heon ; Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
• (where): München
• (when): 2014

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.21109
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/103898
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-21109-3
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET