Konferenzbeitrag
Seniority Wages and the Role of Firms in Retirement
In general, retirement is seen as a pure labor supply phenomenon, but firms can have strong incentives to send expensive older workers into retirement. Based on the seniority wage model developed by Lazear (1979), we discuss steep seniority wage profiles as incentives for firms to dismiss older workers before retirement. Conditional on individual retirement incentives, e.g. social security wealth or health status, and personal fixed effects, the steepness of the wage profile will have different incentives for workers as compared to firms when it comes to the retirement date. Using an instrumental variable approach to account for selection of workers in our firms and for reverse causality, we find that firms with higher labor costs for older workers are associated with lower job exit age.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2015: Ökonomische Entwicklung - Theorie und Politik - Session: Labor 5 ; No. E17-V3
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Retirement; Retirement Policies
Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
Social Security and Public Pensions
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Frimmel, Wolfgang
Horvath, Thomas
Schnalzenberger, Mario
Winter-Ebmer, Rudolf
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wann)
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2015
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Konferenzbeitrag
Beteiligte
- Frimmel, Wolfgang
- Horvath, Thomas
- Schnalzenberger, Mario
- Winter-Ebmer, Rudolf
Entstanden
- 2015