Decentralization, Vertical Fiscal Imbalance, and Political Selection

Arbeitspapier

In a career-concern model of politics with endogenous candidacy and different types of politicians, following a decentralization reform, politicians with different skills are elected in municipalities characterized by different levels of autonomous resources. As an effect, consumer welfare increases only, or mainly, in richer municipalities. We test these predictions by exploiting the differentiated reduction in Vertical Fiscal Imbalance in Italian municipalities, due to the strong difference in the tax base, following the decentralization reforms of the '90s. Results strongly support our predictions and are robust to several alternative stories.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4459

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
• Thema: decentralization ; vertical fiscal imbalance ; quality of politicians

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Bordignon, Massimo ; Gamalerio, Matteo ; Turati, Gilberto
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2013

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/89765
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ