Arbeitspapier
A Cost-side Analysis on Collusive Sustainability
In an oligopoly supergame, firm`s actions in prices and quantities are subject to non-negativity constraints. These aonstarints can obstruct the practicability of oprimal punishment (a la Abreu (1989), Lambson (1987), and Hacker (1996)) in sustaining tacit collusion. Noting that the prospect of single-period optimal punichment depends indispensably upon firms` ability to charge prices strictly below marginal costs (loss-making pricing), under the presence of positive rice constraints, marginal costs can serve as a "fudge" to materialize single-period optimal punishment. In this pa-per we charactarise the effects of profit-cost ratios (or mark-ups) on the sustainability of tacit col-lusion, in light of optimal punishment.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 355
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Lambertini, Luca
Sasaki, Dan
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (where)
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Bologna
- (when)
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1999
- DOI
-
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4954
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Lambertini, Luca
- Sasaki, Dan
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Time of origin
- 1999
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