Arbeitspapier
Promoting coordination in summary-statistic games
This paper studies how external incentives can help agents to coordinate in summary-statistic games. Agents follow a myopic best-reply rule and face a trade-off between efficiency and strategic uncertainty. A principal can help agents to coordinate on the Pareto optimal equilibrium by monitoring an appropriate number of agents. The optimal monitoring policy is 'minimally-invasive' - for every strategy profile of the agents, the principal either monitors just enough agents to make high effort a best-reply or does not monitor at all. Furthermore, given the principal's payoffs are supermodular and increasing at an increasing rate, the optimal monitoring policy is monotone in the number of agents who choose high effort.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Papers in Economics and Statistics ; No. 2013-28
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
Economics of Contract: Theory
- Thema
-
adaptive learning
Markov decision process
coordination failure
order-statistic game
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Erharter, Dominik
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Innsbruck, Research Platform Empirical and Experimental Economics (eeecon)
- (wo)
-
Innsbruck
- (wann)
-
2013
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Erharter, Dominik
- University of Innsbruck, Research Platform Empirical and Experimental Economics (eeecon)
Entstanden
- 2013
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