With a Little Help from the Opposition? Relaxing Term Limits in the Argentine Provinces, 1983-2017

Journal article | Zeitschriftenartikel

How do incumbents manage to relax term limits when they cannot impose their preferences unilaterally? Interpreting constitutional reforms as a bargaining game between a term-limited executive and the opposition, we argue that reforms involving term limits should be more likely when (a) the incumbent party can change the constitution unilaterally or (b) the opposition is pessimistic about its future electoral prospects. Moreover, (c) this second effect should be stronger when a single opposition party has veto power over a reform, because this precludes the executive from playing a "divide-and-rule" strategy. We examine these claims with data from the Argentine provinces between 1983 and 2013. Consistent with expectations, the results show that the probability of initiating a reform is highest when the executive’s party controls a supermajority of seats, but falls sharply when a single opposition party has veto power over a reform, and this party expects to do well in the next executive election.

Object Details

• Alternative title: ¿Con una Mano de la Oposición? Introduciendo la Reelección Ejecutiva en las Provincias Argentinas, 1983-2017
• ISSN: 1868-4890
• Extent: Seite(n): 49-90
• Language: Englisch
• Notes: Status: Veröffentlichungsversion; begutachtet (peer reviewed)

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Journal of Politics in Latin America, 9(3)

Classification and Topics

• Subject: Staatsformen und Regierungssysteme ; Politikwissenschaft ; Staat, staatliche Organisationsformen ; politische Willensbildung, politische Soziologie, politische Kultur ; Argentinien ; institutioneller Wandel ; Verfassungsänderung ; Verfassung ; Reform ; Exekutive ; Opposition ; Lateinamerika

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Lucardi, Adrián ; Almaraz, Gabriela
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (where): Deutschland
• (when): 2017

Further information

• URN: urn:nbn:de:gbv:18-4-10743
• Rights: GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln
• Last update: 21.06.2024, 4:27 PM CEST