Journal article | Zeitschriftenartikel
With a Little Help from the Opposition? Relaxing Term Limits in the Argentine Provinces, 1983-2017
How do incumbents manage to relax term limits when they cannot impose their preferences unilaterally? Interpreting constitutional reforms as a bargaining game between a term-limited executive and the opposition, we argue that reforms involving term limits should be more likely when (a) the incumbent party can change the constitution unilaterally or (b) the opposition is pessimistic about its future electoral prospects. Moreover, (c) this second effect should be stronger when a single opposition party has veto power over a reform, because this precludes the executive from playing a "divide-and-rule" strategy. We examine these claims with data from the Argentine provinces between 1983 and 2013. Consistent with expectations, the results show that the probability of initiating a reform is highest when the executive’s party controls a supermajority of seats, but falls sharply when a single opposition party has veto power over a reform, and this party expects to do well in the next executive election.
- Weitere Titel
-
¿Con una Mano de la Oposición? Introduciendo la Reelección Ejecutiva en las Provincias Argentinas, 1983-2017
- ISSN
-
1868-4890
- Umfang
-
Seite(n): 49-90
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Anmerkungen
-
Status: Veröffentlichungsversion; begutachtet (peer reviewed)
- Erschienen in
-
Journal of Politics in Latin America, 9(3)
- Thema
-
Staatsformen und Regierungssysteme
Politikwissenschaft
Staat, staatliche Organisationsformen
politische Willensbildung, politische Soziologie, politische Kultur
Argentinien
institutioneller Wandel
Verfassungsänderung
Verfassung
Reform
Exekutive
Opposition
Lateinamerika
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Lucardi, Adrián
Almaraz, Gabriela
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
-
Deutschland
- (wann)
-
2017
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:gbv:18-4-10743
- Rechteinformation
-
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
21.06.2024, 16:27 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Zeitschriftenartikel
Beteiligte
- Lucardi, Adrián
- Almaraz, Gabriela
Entstanden
- 2017
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