Barrgh-gaining with Somali Pirates

Arbeitspapier

Ransoms paid to Somali pirates are drifting upward and negotiation times are increasing, yet there is huge variation in bargaining outcomes across shipowners. We use a unique dataset of 179 Somali hijackings, and an underlying theoretical model of the bargaining process based on detailed interviews with ransom negotiators, to analyze the empirical determinants of ransom amounts and negotiation lengths. We find that ransom amount and negotiation length depend on the observable characteristics of both pirates and ships and on the "reference ransom" established by previous ransom payments for a specific ship type. International naval enforcement efforts have driven up ransom amounts. We also observe a "hump-shape" in ransoms, with relatively low ransoms being paid following both short and very long negotiations, and the highest ransoms paid following intermediate length negotiations.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Economics of Security Working Paper ; No. 74

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law ; Other Economic Systems: Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
• Thema: Piracy ; ransom ; duration ; bargaining ; law enforcement ; Somalia

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): de Groot, Olaf J. ; Rablen, Matthew D. ; Shortland, Anja
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
• (wo): Berlin
• (wann): 2012

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/119400
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ