Optimal Search Auctions

Arbeitspapier

We study the design of profit maximizing single unit auctions under the assumption that the seller needs to incur costs to contact prospective bidders and inform them about the auction. With independent bidders’ types and possibly interdependent valuations, the seller’s problem can be reduced to a search problem in which the surplus is measured in terms of virtual utilities minus search costs. Compared to the socially efficient mechanism, the optimal mechanism features fewer participants, longer search conditional on the same set of participants, and inefficient sequence of entry.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1421

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft
• Subject: Auktionstheorie ; Suchtheorie ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Crémer, Jacques ; Spiegel, Yossi ; Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
• (where): Evanston, IL
• (when): 2005

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31214
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET