Strategic information transmission and stochastic orders

Arbeitspapier

I develop new results on uniqueness and comparative statics of equilibria in the Crawford and Sobel (1982) strategic information transmission game. For a class of utility functions, I demonstrate that logconcavity of the density implies uniqueness of equilibria inducing a given number of Receiver actions. I provide comparative statics results with respect to the distribution of types for distributions that are comparable in the likelihood ratio order, implying, e.g., that advice from a better informed Sender induces the Receiver to choose actions that are more spread out.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 386

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• Thema: strategic information transmission ; cheap talk ; uniqueness ; comparative statics ; logconcavity ; likelihood ratio order ; Informationsverhalten ; Informationsverbreitung ; Spieltheorie ; Gleichgewicht ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Szalay, Dezsö
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
• (wo): München
• (wann): 2012

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.14011
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93951
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-14011-6
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 20.09.2024, 08:24 MESZ