Arbeitspapier
Worker or shirker: Who evades more taxes?. A real effort experiment
With the help of a real effort experiment, we analyze if tax evasion depends on the amount of effort invested to generate income. In three treatments, subjects were either endowed with income or had to work moderately or hard to earn it. In line with prospect theory, subjects evaded more taxes when they worked hard for their income. We find little evidence for the prediction that tax evasion in the endowed treatment is higher than in the moderate work treatment.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics ; No. 26-2013
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
- Thema
-
tax evasion
prospect theory
house money effect
sunk cost effect
real effort experiment
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bühren, Christoph
Kundt, Thorben
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Philipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics
- (wo)
-
Marburg
- (wann)
-
2013
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bühren, Christoph
- Kundt, Thorben
- Philipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics
Entstanden
- 2013
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