Monetary Regimes and the Co-Ordination of Wage Setting

Arbeitspapier

International comparisons show that countries with co-ordinated wage setting generally have lower unemployment than countries with less co-ordinated wage setting. This paper argues that the monetary regime may affect whether co-ordination among many wage setters is feasible. A strict monetary regime, like a country-specific inflation target, to some extent disciplines wage setters, so that the consequences of uncoordinated wage setting are less detrimental than under a more passive monetary regime (eg a monetary union). Thus, the gains from co-ordination are larger under a passive regime. Under some circumstances a passive regime may induce co-operation in wage setting, and thus lower unemployment, when a stricter regime would not.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 429

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft
• Subject: Wage setting ; co-ordination ; equilibrium unemployment ; monetary regime ; monetary union ; wage moderation

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Holden, Steinar
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2001

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/75700
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET