Arbeitspapier

Monetary Regimes and the Co-Ordination of Wage Setting

International comparisons show that countries with co-ordinated wage setting generally have lower unemployment than countries with less co-ordinated wage setting. This paper argues that the monetary regime may affect whether co-ordination among many wage setters is feasible. A strict monetary regime, like a country-specific inflation target, to some extent disciplines wage setters, so that the consequences of uncoordinated wage setting are less detrimental than under a more passive monetary regime (eg a monetary union). Thus, the gains from co-ordination are larger under a passive regime. Under some circumstances a passive regime may induce co-operation in wage setting, and thus lower unemployment, when a stricter regime would not.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 429

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
Wage setting
co-ordination
equilibrium unemployment
monetary regime
monetary union
wage moderation

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Holden, Steinar
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2001

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Holden, Steinar
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2001

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