Monetary regime and the co-ordination of wage setting

Arbeitspapier

International comparisons show that countries with co-ordinated wage setting generally have lower unemployment than countries with less co-ordinated wage setting. This paper argues that the monetary regime may affect whether co-ordination among many wage setters is feasible. A strict monetary regime, like a country-specific inflation target, to some extent disciplines wage setters, so that the consequences of uncoordinated wage setting are less detrimental than under a more passive monetary regime (eg a monetary union). Thus, the gains from co-ordination are larger under a passive regime. Under some circumstances a passive regime may induce co-operation in wage setting, and thus lower unemployment, when a stricter regime would not.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Memorandum ; No. 2000,01

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity ; Monetary Policy
• Subject: Wage setting ; co-ordination ; equilibrium unemployment ; monetary regime ; monetary union ; Geldpolitik ; Inflation Targeting ; Wirkungsanalyse ; Lohnbildung ; Vergleich ; OECD-Staaten

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Holden, Steinar
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Oslo, Department of Economics
• (where): Oslo
• (when): 2000

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/63050
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET