Dynamic contracts when agent's quality is unknown

Artikel

We solve a long-term contracting problem with symmetric uncertainty about the agent's quality, and a hidden action of the agent. As information about quality accumulates, incentives become easier to provide because the agent has less room to manipulate the principal's beliefs. This result is opposite to that in the literature on "career concerns" in which incentives via short-term contracts become harder to provide as the agent's quality is revealed over time.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 9 ; Year: 2014 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 865-914 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness ; Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity ; Labor Contracts
• Thema: Principal-agent model ; optimal contract ; learning ; private information ; reputation ; career

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Jovanovic, Boyan ; Prat, Julien
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): The Econometric Society
• (wo): New Haven, CT
• (wann): 2014

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.3982/TE1439
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/150239
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ