Arbeitspapier
Auctions and leaks: A theoretical and experimental investigation
In first- and second-price private value auctions with sequential bidding, second movers may discover the first movers' bid. Equilibrium behavior in the first-price auction is mostly unaffected but there are multiple equilibria in the second- price auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price rules are equivocal. Experimentally, leaks in the first- price auction favor second movers but harm first movers and sellers, as theoretically predicted. Low to medium leak probabilities eliminate the usual revenue dominance of first- over second-price auctions. With a high leak probability, second-price auctions generate significantly more revenue.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2017-012
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Auctions
- Subject
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auction
collusion
espionage
laboratory experiment
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Fischer, Sven
Güth, Werner
Kaplan, Todd R.
Zultan, Ro'i
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Friedrich Schiller University Jena
- (where)
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Jena
- (when)
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2017
- Handle
- Last update
- 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Fischer, Sven
- Güth, Werner
- Kaplan, Todd R.
- Zultan, Ro'i
- Friedrich Schiller University Jena
Time of origin
- 2017