Arbeitspapier

Auctions and leaks: A theoretical and experimental investigation

In first- and second-price private value auctions with sequential bidding, second movers may discover the first movers' bid. Equilibrium behavior in the first-price auction is mostly unaffected but there are multiple equilibria in the second- price auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price rules are equivocal. Experimentally, leaks in the first- price auction favor second movers but harm first movers and sellers, as theoretically predicted. Low to medium leak probabilities eliminate the usual revenue dominance of first- over second-price auctions. With a high leak probability, second-price auctions generate significantly more revenue.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2017-012

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Auctions
Subject
auction
collusion
espionage
laboratory experiment

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Fischer, Sven
Güth, Werner
Kaplan, Todd R.
Zultan, Ro'i
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Friedrich Schiller University Jena
(where)
Jena
(when)
2017

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Fischer, Sven
  • Güth, Werner
  • Kaplan, Todd R.
  • Zultan, Ro'i
  • Friedrich Schiller University Jena

Time of origin

  • 2017

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