Arbeitspapier
Auctions and leaks: A theoretical and experimental investigation
In first- and second-price private value auctions with sequential bidding, second movers may discover the first movers' bid. Equilibrium behavior in the first-price auction is mostly unaffected but there are multiple equilibria in the second- price auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price rules are equivocal. Experimentally, leaks in the first- price auction favor second movers but harm first movers and sellers, as theoretically predicted. Low to medium leak probabilities eliminate the usual revenue dominance of first- over second-price auctions. With a high leak probability, second-price auctions generate significantly more revenue.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2017-012
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Auctions
- Thema
-
auction
collusion
espionage
laboratory experiment
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Fischer, Sven
Güth, Werner
Kaplan, Todd R.
Zultan, Ro'i
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Friedrich Schiller University Jena
- (wo)
-
Jena
- (wann)
-
2017
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
- 11.01.2024, 08:36 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Fischer, Sven
- Güth, Werner
- Kaplan, Todd R.
- Zultan, Ro'i
- Friedrich Schiller University Jena
Entstanden
- 2017
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