Arbeitspapier
Monopoly sale of a network good
This paper studies the problem of a monopolist who sells a network good through a price posting scheme. The scheme posts a price of every possible allocation for each buyer, who are then asked to report their private information to the seller. The seller then implements the allocation based on the reports. The social choice functions that are ex post implementable through such a sales scheme are characterized, and the conditions are identified under which the revenue maximizing scheme has the property that the price of a larger network is more affordable than that of a smaller network.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 794
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Thema
-
network externalities
ex post equilibrium
revenue maximization
Netzwerkökonomik
Monopol
Asymmetrische Information
Eigeninteresse
Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Aoyagi, Masaki
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
- (wo)
-
Osaka
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Aoyagi, Masaki
- Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Entstanden
- 2010