Arbeitspapier

Quality Differentiation in Durable Goods Monopoly Always Yields Strictly Positive Profits

A monopolist producing vertically differentiated durable goods can offer in each period a sequence of price-quality menus to segment the market. We show that, contrary to the Coase conjecture for the homogeneous durable good monopoly, thanks to the ability to produce differentiated durable goods, in all Markov-Perfect Equilibria, the profit of a monopolist that cannot commit to future price-quality menus is bounded below by a strictly positive value independent of the discount factor.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 9331

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Monopoly
Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
Thema
product quality
durable good monopoly
second-degree price discrimination
Coase conjecture

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Laussel, Didier
Long, Ngo Van
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2021

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Laussel, Didier
  • Long, Ngo Van
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2021

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