Arbeitspapier

Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Theory and Evidence from Timber Auctions

We study entry and bidding patterns in sealed bid and open auctions with heterogeneous bidders. Using data from U.S. Forest Service timber auctions, we document a set of systematic effects of auction format: sealed bid auctions attract more small bidders, shift the allocation towards these bidders, and can also generate higher revenue. We propose a model, which extends the theory of private value auctions with heterogeneous bidders to capture participation decisions, that can account for these qualitative effects of auction format. We then calibrate the model using parameters estimated from the data and show that the model can explain the quantitative effects as well. Finally, we use the model to provide an assessment of bidder competitiveness, which has important consequences for auction choice.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 142.2004

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Renewable Resources and Conservation: Forestry
Auctions
Thema
Auctions
Timber
Auktionstheorie
Auktion
Holzmarkt
Schätzung
USA

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Levin, Jonathan
Athey, Susan
Seira, Enrique
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(wo)
Milano
(wann)
2004

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Levin, Jonathan
  • Athey, Susan
  • Seira, Enrique
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Entstanden

  • 2004

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