Ascending auctions with bidder asymmetries

Artikel

We present a partial identification approach for ascending auctions wit bidder asymmetries, where bidders' asymmetric types may be unobservable to the econometrician. Our approach yields sharp bounds and builds on and generalizes other recent bounds approaches for correlated private values ascending auctions. When bidder identities are observable , our approach yields tighter bounds than previous approaches that ignore asymmetry, demonstrating that bidder asymmetries can function as an aid rather than a hindrance to identification. We present a nonparametric estimation and inference approach relying on our identification argument and apply it to data from U.S. timber auctions, finding that bounds on optimal reserve prices and other objects of interest are noticeably tighter when exploiting bidder asymmetries.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Journal: Quantitative Economics ; ISSN: 1759-7331 ; Volume: 8 ; Year: 2017 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 181-200 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General ; Auctions ; Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
• Subject: Ascending auction ; partial identification ; correlated values ; asymmetries

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Coey, Dominic ; Larsen, Bradley ; Sweeney, Kane ; Waisman, Caio
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): The Econometric Society
• (where): New Haven, CT
• (when): 2017

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.3982/QE474
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/195537
• Last update: 06.05.3025, 7:02 PM CEST