Preferences under ignorance

Arbeitspapier

A decision maker (DM) makes choices from different sets of alternatives. The DM is initially fully ignorant of the payoff associated to each alternative, and learns these payoffs only after a large number of choices have been made. We show that, in the presence of an outside option once payoffs are learned, the optimal choice rule from sets of alternatives is one that is as if the DM had strict preferences over all alternatives. Under this model, the DM has preferences for preferences while being ignorant of what preferences are "right".

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers ; No. 546

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles ; Consumer Economics: Theory
• Subject: consistency ; strict preference ; rationality ; weak axiom of revealed preferences

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Gossner, Olivier ; Kuzmics, Christoph
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW)
• (where): Bielefeld
• (when): 2015

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/121343
• URN: urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-27758928
• Last update: 2025-03-10T11:43:41+0100