Arbeitspapier

The Rise of NGO Activism

Activist NGOs increasingly oppose industrial projects that have nevertheless been approved by public regulators. To understand this recent rise in NGO activism, we develop a theory of optimal regulation in which a regulated industry seeks to undertake a project that may be harmful to society. On the one hand, public regulation is vulnerable to the influence of the industry, and may approve the project even though it is harmful. On the other hand, an NGO may oppose the project. We characterize the circumstances under which NGO opposition occurs and the circumstances under which this opposition is socially beneficial. The theory is used to explain the role that NGOs have assumed in the last decades, and has implications for the legal status of NGO activism and the appropriate degree of transparency.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Economics Working Paper Series ; No. 16/244

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Thema
Nichtregierungsorganisation
Regulierungstheorie
Interessenpolitik

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Daubanes, Julien
Rochet, Jean-Charles
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
(wo)
Zurich
(wann)
2016

DOI
doi:10.3929/ethz-a-010624665
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Daubanes, Julien
  • Rochet, Jean-Charles
  • ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research

Entstanden

  • 2016

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