Arbeitspapier

Corporate political activism and information transfers

Prior research suggests that: (1) politically active firms have an information advantage over firms that do not engage in the political process, but also that (2) politically active firms are more likely to disclose policy-related information. We examine whether there are externalities associated with the processing of political information by politically active firms. We study this question in the setting of intra-industry information transfers around earnings announcements. Measuring firms' political activism using campaign contributions, we find stronger intra-industry information transfers from politically active firms to their industry peers. These information transfers are stronger when there is more discussion during conference calls of political topics that have industry or market-wide implications. Similarly, these information transfers are also stronger when there is greater political uncertainty. Our paper highlights an important information externality related to politically active firms' disclosures and improves our understanding of how politically active firms affect their industries' information environment.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: New Working Paper Series ; No. 334

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Accounting
Accounting and Auditing: Government Policy and Regulation
Thema
Information transfer
earnings announcements
political economy

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Christensen, Dane M.
Jin, Hengda
Lee, Joshua A.
Sridharan, Suhas A.
Wellman, Laura A.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Chicago Booth School of Business, Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State
(wo)
Chicago, IL
(wann)
2023

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Christensen, Dane M.
  • Jin, Hengda
  • Lee, Joshua A.
  • Sridharan, Suhas A.
  • Wellman, Laura A.
  • University of Chicago Booth School of Business, Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State

Entstanden

  • 2023

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