Arbeitspapier

Political Activism as a Determinant of Clientelistic Transfers: Evidence from an Indian Public Works Program

Are political activists preferentially targeted by politicians engaging in clientelistic transfers to bolster political support? We provide the first model to highlight two possible rationales for such transfers: to mobilize support from the activists themselves, or to mobilize support from electors these activists have influence over. Using novel household data on ex ante political affiliation and jobs received subsequent to large-scale decentralized workfare program in India, we find that activists are indeed preferentially targeted, and furthermore, such transfers are more pronounced in locations where citizen political involvement is less common, and in remote and less connected areas where activists' role in information transfers is most critical. We argue that the evidence is consistent with the use of transfers to leverage the influence of activists over the decision-making of other electors. Our results are not driven by self selection, reverse causality, and other program transfers, and are robust to alternate definitions of "activism".

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 11277

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
political clientelism
political activism
NREGS
India

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Chau, Nancy
Liu, Yanyan
Soundararajan, Vidhya
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2018

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Chau, Nancy
  • Liu, Yanyan
  • Soundararajan, Vidhya
  • Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Time of origin

  • 2018

Other Objects (12)