Tradable emission permits in a federal system

Arbeitspapier

A system of tradable permits in the standard setting is effective in attaining the policy objective with regard to pollution reduction at the least cost. This outcome is challenged in case of a tradable permit system in a federal state with individual states having discretionary power regarding environmental policy and where pollution is transboundary across states. This paper explores the opportunities of the central authority to influence the effectiveness of the system, under different institutional arrangements, through the initial allocation of permits.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1482

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation ; Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics: General ; Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
• Subject: tradable permits ; trade bans ; fiscal federalism ; Emissionshandel ; Finanzföderalismus ; Grenzüberschreitende Umweltbelastung ; Umweltpolitik ; Emissionsrechte ; Allokation ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Verbon, Harrie A. A. ; Withagen, Cees A.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2005

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18946
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET