Arbeitspapier
On myopia as rationale for social security
This paper revisits the role played by myopia in generating a theoretical rationale for pay-as-you-go social security in dynamically efficient economies. Contrary to received wisdom, if the real interest rate is exogenously fixed, enough myopia may justify public pensions but never alongside positive private savings. With sufficient myopia, co-existence of positive optimal pensions and positive private saving is possible if the real interest rate on saving evolves endogenously, as in a model with a neoclassical technology.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2401
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Social Security and Public Pensions
- Thema
-
Myopia
pensions
social security
dynamic efficiency
Soziale Sicherung
Gesetzliche Rentenversicherung
Umlageverfahren
Sparen
Verhaltensökonomik
Dynamisches Modell
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Andersen, Torben M.
Bhattacharya, Joydeep
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2008
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Andersen, Torben M.
- Bhattacharya, Joydeep
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2008
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