Arbeitspapier
Optimal Central Bank Lending
We analyze optimal monetary policy in a sticky pricemodel where the central bank supplies money outrightvia asset purchases and lends money temporarily againstcollateral. The terms of central bank lending affect ra-tioning of money and impact on macroeconomic aggre-gates. The central bank can set the policy rate and itsinflation target in a way that implements the first bestlong-run allocation, which is impossible if money weresupplied in a lump-sum way (as commonly assumed).Efficient central bank lending further increases gainsfrom macroeconomic stabilization beyond pure interestrate policy. This requires departing from a Treasuries-only regime.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 10-057/2
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Business Fluctuations; Cycles
- Subject
-
Optimal monetary policy
central bank instruments
collateralized lending
liquidity premium
inflation
Geldpolitik
Kreditsicherung
Liquidität
Preisrigidität
Inflationssteuerung
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Schabert, Andreas
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (where)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (when)
-
2010
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Schabert, Andreas
- Tinbergen Institute
Time of origin
- 2010
Other Objects (12)
Shadow Banking and Traditional Bank Lending: The Role of Implicit Guarantees
Credit Protection and Lending Relationships
New Economy, Old Central Banks?
Asset-Based Lending
Designing financial support for SMEs during crises: The role of bank lending
Central Bank Instruments, Fiscal Policy Regimes, and the Requirements for Equilibrium Determinacy
Banking Competition and Soft Budget Constraints: How Market Power can threaten Discipline in Lending
Optimal Incentives without Expected Utility
Optimal Income Taxation with Endogenous Human Capital
Optimal Taxation of Human Capital and Credit Constraints
Optimal Commodity Taxation Under Non-linear Income Taxation
Optimal Commodity Taxation When Households Earn Multiple Incomes
Shadow Banking and Traditional Bank Lending: The Role of Implicit Guarantees
Credit Protection and Lending Relationships
New Economy, Old Central Banks?
Asset-Based Lending
Designing financial support for SMEs during crises: The role of bank lending
Central Bank Instruments, Fiscal Policy Regimes, and the Requirements for Equilibrium Determinacy
Banking Competition and Soft Budget Constraints: How Market Power can threaten Discipline in Lending
Optimal Incentives without Expected Utility
Optimal Income Taxation with Endogenous Human Capital
Optimal Taxation of Human Capital and Credit Constraints
Optimal Commodity Taxation Under Non-linear Income Taxation
Optimal Commodity Taxation When Households Earn Multiple Incomes
Shadow Banking and Traditional Bank Lending: The Role of Implicit Guarantees
Credit Protection and Lending Relationships
New Economy, Old Central Banks?
Asset-Based Lending
Designing financial support for SMEs during crises: The role of bank lending
Central Bank Instruments, Fiscal Policy Regimes, and the Requirements for Equilibrium Determinacy
Banking Competition and Soft Budget Constraints: How Market Power can threaten Discipline in Lending
Optimal Incentives without Expected Utility
Optimal Income Taxation with Endogenous Human Capital
Optimal Taxation of Human Capital and Credit Constraints
Optimal Commodity Taxation Under Non-linear Income Taxation