Arbeitspapier
Dominant strategy implementation in economic environments
We study dominant strategy implementation especially in economic environments. We first showthat in general environments, strategy-proofness and quasi-strong-non-bossiness together are necessary and sufficient for dominant strategy implementation via the associated direct revelationmechanism. We next prove that in weak separable environments, strategy-proofness is sufficient for dominant strategy implementation, by using an augmented revelation mechanism similar to the one devised by Jackson et al. (1994). Moreover, we focus on pure exchange economies without free disposal, and try to construct another augmented revelation mechanism that satisfies balancedness in and out of equilibrium, and which implements all strategy-proof social choice functions in dominant strategy equilibria.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 669
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Exchange and Production Economies
Noncooperative Games
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- Thema
-
Augmented Revelation Mechanism
Strategy-Proofness
Balancedness
Quasi-Strong-Non-Bossiness
The Revelation Principle
Spieltheorie
Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion
Tauschwirtschaft
Nash-Gleichgewicht
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Mizukami, Hideki
Wakayama, Takuma
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
- (wo)
-
Osaka
- (wann)
-
2006
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Mizukami, Hideki
- Wakayama, Takuma
- Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Entstanden
- 2006
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