Predatory Exclusive Dealing

Arbeitspapier

While the previous literature on exclusive dealing has been concerned with the question of how exclusive dealing can raise static profits, this paper analyzes the question of how exclusive dealing can be used to predate in a dynamic context. It is shown that exclusive dealing may arise even if it reduces static profits. Exclusivity provisions may not only allow excluding efficient competitors, but indeed are often a cheaper exclusionary tool than predatory pricing. This is the case if the prey's access to finance is not too limited. Furthermore, it is more likely that exclusive dealing is preferable compared to predatory pricing the more market power the predator has with respect to the prey.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Munich Discussion Paper ; No. 2009-9

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Antitrust Law ; Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms ; Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies ; Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices ; Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
• Subject: exclusive dealing ; predation ; Vertriebsbindung ; Verdrängungswettbewerb ; Spieltheorie ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Klein, Joachim ; Zenger, Hans
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
• (where): München
• (when): 2009

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.10626
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/104285
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-10626-0
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET