Arbeitspapier
The individual micro-lending contract: Is it a better design than joint-liability? - Evidence from Georgia
We analyze the incentive mechanism of individual micro-lending contracts and we compare its key factors with those of joint-liability loan contracts. Using our data set, we firstly show that in the individual contract there are three elements, the demand for non-conventional collateral, a screening procedure which combines new with traditional elements, and dynamic incentives in combination with the termination threat in case of default, which ensure high repayment rates of up to 100%. We further show that the joint-liability approach may lead to similar repayment rates, however based on a different incentive system. We reveal that the target group which can be efficiently served by either one of the two mechanisms is different.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper Series ; No. 2005,10
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Mikrofinanzierung
Kreditgeschäft
Haftung
Ökonomischer Anreiz
Georgien
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Vigenina, Denitsa
Kritikos, Alexander S.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
European University Viadrina, The Postgraduate Research Programme: Capital Markets and Finance in the Enlarged Europe
- (wo)
-
Frankfurt (Oder)
- (wann)
-
2005
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:47 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Vigenina, Denitsa
- Kritikos, Alexander S.
- European University Viadrina, The Postgraduate Research Programme: Capital Markets and Finance in the Enlarged Europe
Entstanden
- 2005
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