Arbeitspapier
Containing Tariff Evasion
To identify transactions at risk of tariff evasion, this paper matches export transaction data from France with import transaction data from Madagascar using container identifiers. Reporting discrepancies between exporters and importers are prevalent but small, with over two-fifths of importers reporting in a way that increases their tariff liability. Yet, aggregate tariff revenues are 24 percent lower due to discrepancies. These revenue losses are highly concentrated: the top five evaders account for three-quarters of all tariff revenue losses and larger shipments are more at risk of evasion. Tariff enforcement in Madagascar is ineffective and only marginally mitigates revenue losses.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 10795
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
- Subject
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tax evasion
mirror statistics
trade
corruption
exporters
importers
tariffs
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Anne, Clement
Chalendard, Cyril
Fernandes, Ana
Rijkers, Bob
Vicard, Vincent
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
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Munich
- (when)
-
2023
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Anne, Clement
- Chalendard, Cyril
- Fernandes, Ana
- Rijkers, Bob
- Vicard, Vincent
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2023
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Fair tax evasion
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Tariff Volatility and Tariff Policy in Developed and Developing Countries
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