Artikel

On asymmetric reserve prices

We investigate equilibrium bidding in first-price auctions with asymmetric reserve prices. For example, the auctioneer may set a low reserve price for one subset of bidders and a high reserve price for others. When used to pursue a distributional objective, lowering the reserve price for some bidders channels benefits toward marginal agents in the favored group and does not adversely impact nonfavored bidders whose reserve price is unchanged. Even in symmetric environments, when the valuation distribution is not regular, introducing asymmetric reserve prices can increase the auctioneer's revenue compared to an optimal common reserve price. Implications for auction design are considered.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 13 ; Year: 2018 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 205-237 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Auctions
Thema
First-price auction
asymmetric auctions
reserve price
mechanism design
affirmative action
procurement

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Kotowski, Maciej H.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The Econometric Society
(wo)
New Haven, CT
(wann)
2018

DOI
doi:10.3982/TE1824
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

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Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Kotowski, Maciej H.
  • The Econometric Society

Entstanden

  • 2018

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