Reconciling insurance with market discipline: A blueprint for a European fiscal union

Arbeitspapier

This contribution develops a blueprint for a European fiscal union. The proposal addresses the shortcomings of most other reform designs which do not offer a solution for insolvent or noncooperative euro countries. We suggest a design which combines fiscal insurance with an orderly procedure to restructure the debt of an insolvent euro member. We show that fiscal insurance and a sovereign insolvency procedure are no contradiction but, on the contrary, mutually enforcing: An effective fiscal insurance helps to limit the stability risks involved in the implementation of an insolvency regime for sovereigns. And vice versa, a well-defined insolvency procedure reduces the danger that a fiscal capacity motivated as an insurance against transitory asymmetric shocks degenerates into a permanent transfer system. Moreover, we show that both elements are a helpful complement for the functioning of the European banking union and the new European fiscal governance.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 15-044

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods ; Crisis Management
• Thema: sovereign insolvency procedure ; European unemployment insurance ; euro area debt crisis

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Dolls, Mathias ; Fuest, Clemens ; Heinemann, Friedrich ; Peichl, Andreas
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
• (wo): Mannheim
• (wann): 2015

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/112754
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-394892
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ