Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets

Arbeitspapier

This paper considers the object allocation problem introduced by Shapley and Scarf (1974). We study secure implementation (Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato, 2007), that is, double implementation in dominant strategy and Nash equilibria. We prove that (i) an individually rational solution is securely implementable if and only if it is the no-trade solution, (ii) a neutral solution is securely implementable if and only if it is a serial dictatorship, and (iii) an efficient solution is securely implementable if and only if it is a sequential dictatorship. Furthermore, we provide a complete characterization of securely implementable solutions in the two-agent case.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 727

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis ; Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
• Subject: Secure implementation ; Sequential dictatorship ; Strict core ; Strategyproofness ; Shapley-Scarf housing markets ; Immobilien ; Allokation ; Agentenbasierte Modellierung ; Nichtkooperatives Spiel ; Neue politische Ökonomie ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Fujinaka, Yuji ; Wakayama, Takuma
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
• (where): Osaka
• (when): 2009

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92821
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET