Arbeitspapier
Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
This paper considers the object allocation problem introduced by Shapley and Scarf (1974). We study secure implementation (Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato, 2007), that is, double implementation in dominant strategy and Nash equilibria. We prove that (i) an individually rational solution is securely implementable if and only if it is the no-trade solution, (ii) a neutral solution is securely implementable if and only if it is a serial dictatorship, and (iii) an efficient solution is securely implementable if and only if it is a sequential dictatorship. Furthermore, we provide a complete characterization of securely implementable solutions in the two-agent case.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 727
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- Thema
-
Secure implementation
Sequential dictatorship
Strict core
Strategyproofness
Shapley-Scarf housing markets
Immobilien
Allokation
Agentenbasierte Modellierung
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Neue politische Ökonomie
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Fujinaka, Yuji
Wakayama, Takuma
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
- (wo)
-
Osaka
- (wann)
-
2009
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Fujinaka, Yuji
- Wakayama, Takuma
- Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Entstanden
- 2009
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