Artikel
Secure implementation
Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling be a dominant strategy, is a standard concept in social choice theory. However, this concept has serious drawbacks. In particular, many strategy-proof mechanisms have multiple Nash equilibria, some of which produce the wrong outcome. A possible solution to this problem is to require double implementation in Nash equilibrium and in dominant strategies, i.e., secure implementation. We characterize securely implementable social choice functions and investigate the connections with dominant strategy implementation and robust implementation. We show that in standard quasi-linear environments with divisible private or public goods, there exist surplus-maximizing (non-dictatorial) social choice functions that can be securely implemented.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 2 ; Year: 2007 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 203-229 ; New York, NY: The Econometric Society
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Public Goods
- Subject
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Nash implementation
robust implementation
secure implementation
strategy-proofness
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Sjostrom, Tomas
Yamato, Takehiko
Saijo, Tatsuyoshi
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
The Econometric Society
- (where)
-
New York, NY
- (when)
-
2007
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Sjostrom, Tomas
- Yamato, Takehiko
- Saijo, Tatsuyoshi
- The Econometric Society
Time of origin
- 2007
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