Artikel

Secure implementation

Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling be a dominant strategy, is a standard concept in social choice theory. However, this concept has serious drawbacks. In particular, many strategy-proof mechanisms have multiple Nash equilibria, some of which produce the wrong outcome. A possible solution to this problem is to require double implementation in Nash equilibrium and in dominant strategies, i.e., secure implementation. We characterize securely implementable social choice functions and investigate the connections with dominant strategy implementation and robust implementation. We show that in standard quasi-linear environments with divisible private or public goods, there exist surplus-maximizing (non-dictatorial) social choice functions that can be securely implemented.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 2 ; Year: 2007 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 203-229 ; New York, NY: The Econometric Society

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Public Goods
Thema
Nash implementation
robust implementation
secure implementation
strategy-proofness

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Sjostrom, Tomas
Yamato, Takehiko
Saijo, Tatsuyoshi
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The Econometric Society
(wo)
New York, NY
(wann)
2007

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Sjostrom, Tomas
  • Yamato, Takehiko
  • Saijo, Tatsuyoshi
  • The Econometric Society

Entstanden

  • 2007

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