Arbeitspapier
Dynamically consistent preferences under imprecise probabilistic information
This paper extends decision theory under imprecise probabilistic information to dynamic settings. We explore the relationship between the given objective probabilistic information, an agent's subjective multiple priors, and updating. Dynamic consistency implies rectangular sets of priors at the subjective level. As the objective probabilistic information need not be consistent with rectangularity at the subjective level, agents might select priors outside the objective probabilistic information while respecting the support of the given set of priors. Under suitable additional axioms, the subjective set of priors belongs to the rectangular hull of the objective probabilistic information.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers ; No. 573
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- Thema
-
Imprecise information
imprecision aversion
multiple priors
dynamic consistency
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Riedel, Frank
Tallon, Jean-Marc
Vergopoulos, Vassili
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW)
- (wo)
-
Bielefeld
- (wann)
-
2017
- Handle
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-29105813
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Riedel, Frank
- Tallon, Jean-Marc
- Vergopoulos, Vassili
- Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW)
Entstanden
- 2017
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