Artikel

Subjective homophily and the fixtures problem

The Stable Fixtures problem (Irving and Scott (2007)) is a generalized matching model that nests the well-known Stable Roommates, Stable Marriage, and College Admissions problems as special cases. This paper extends a result of the Stable Roommates problem to demonstrate that a class of homophilic preferences with an appealing psychological interpretation is sufficient to ensure that starting from an arbitrary matching, a decentralized process of allowing the sequential matching of randomly chosen blocking pairs will converge to a pairwise-stable matching with probability one. Strategic implications of this class of preferences are examined and further possible generalizations and directions for future research are discussed.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 11 ; Year: 2020 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 1-13 ; Basel: MDPI

Classification
Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Market Design
Subject
homophilic preferences
many-to-many matching
stability
stable fixtures problem

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Duggan, Joseph E.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
MDPI
(where)
Basel
(when)
2020

DOI
doi:10.3390/g11010011
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Duggan, Joseph E.
  • MDPI

Time of origin

  • 2020

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