Artikel
Subjective homophily and the fixtures problem
The Stable Fixtures problem (Irving and Scott (2007)) is a generalized matching model that nests the well-known Stable Roommates, Stable Marriage, and College Admissions problems as special cases. This paper extends a result of the Stable Roommates problem to demonstrate that a class of homophilic preferences with an appealing psychological interpretation is sufficient to ensure that starting from an arbitrary matching, a decentralized process of allowing the sequential matching of randomly chosen blocking pairs will converge to a pairwise-stable matching with probability one. Strategic implications of this class of preferences are examined and further possible generalizations and directions for future research are discussed.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 11 ; Year: 2020 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 1-13 ; Basel: MDPI
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Market Design
- Subject
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homophilic preferences
many-to-many matching
stability
stable fixtures problem
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Duggan, Joseph E.
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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MDPI
- (where)
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Basel
- (when)
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2020
- DOI
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doi:10.3390/g11010011
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Duggan, Joseph E.
- MDPI
Time of origin
- 2020