Arbeitspapier

How Institutions Shape Land Deals: The Role of Corruption

Large-scale land acquisitions often take place in developing countries which are also known for their corruption-friendliness caused by weak institutional frameworks. We hypothesize that corruption indeed leads to more land deals. We argue that corrupt elites exploit poor institutional setups (characterized by corruption) to strike deals with domestic and international investors at the expense of the local population. Using panel data for 156 countries from 2000-2011, we provide evidence that large-scale land deals indeed occur more often in countries with higher levels of corruption. The estimated effects are also economically substantive and particularly relevant to economies with unsound institutions.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5178

Classification
Wirtschaft
International Investment; Long-term Capital Movements
Economic Development: Agriculture; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Other Primary Products
Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment
Subject
large-scale land acquisitions
land grabbing
foreign investments
weak institutions
corruption

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Bujko, Matthias
Fischer, Christian
Krieger, Tim
Meierrieks, Daniel
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2015

Handle
Last update
20.09.2024, 8:22 AM CEST

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Bujko, Matthias
  • Fischer, Christian
  • Krieger, Tim
  • Meierrieks, Daniel
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2015

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