How institutions shape land deals: The role of corruption

Arbeitspapier

Large-scale land acquisitions, or land grabs, concentrate in developing countries which are also known for their corruption-friendly setting caused by a weak institutional framework. We argue that corrupt elites exploit this given institutional set-up to strike deals with international investors at the expense of the local population. Using panel data for 157 countries from 2000-2011, we provide evidence that these land deals indeed occur more often in countries with higher levels of corruption.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Diskussionsbeiträge ; No. 2014-02

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; International Investment; Long-term Capital Movements ; Economic Development: Agriculture; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Other Primary Products ; Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment ; Natural Resources and Domestic and International Conflicts
• Thema: large-scale land acquisitions ; land grabbing ; foreign investments ; weak institutions ; property rights ; corruption ; large-N study

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Bujko, Matthias ; Fischer, Christian ; Krieger, Tim ; Meierrieks, Daniel
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, Wilfried-Guth-Stiftungsprofessur für Ordnungs- und Wettbewerbspolitik
• (wo): Freiburg
• (wann): 2014

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/98848
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 20.09.2024, 08:21 MESZ