- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Journal: CESifo DICE Report ; ISSN: 1613-6373 ; Volume: 08 ; Year: 2010 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 14-23 ; München: ifo Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
- Subject
-
Regulierung
Verantwortung
Wirtschaftsethik
EU-Recht
EU-Staaten
Welt
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Herring, Richard
Kane, Edward J.
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
ifo Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München
- (where)
-
München
- (when)
-
2010
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Herring, Richard
- Kane, Edward J.
- ifo Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München
Time of origin
- 2010
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