Artikel
Inefficient rushes in auctions
We analyze a setting common in privatizations, public tenders, and takeovers in which the ex post efficient allocation, i.e., the first best, is not implementable. Our first main result is that the open ascending auction is not second best because it is prone to rushes, i.e., all active bidders quitting simultaneously, that undermine its efficiency. Our second main result is that the second best can be implemented with a two-round auction used in real-life privatizations. We also show how this result generalizes using a survival auction with a novel tie-breaking rule.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 13 ; Year: 2018 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 273-306 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Auctions
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Thema
-
Privatization
efficiency
auctions
mechanism design
multi-round mechanisms
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Hernando-Veciana, Ángel
Michelucci, Fabio
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
The Econometric Society
- (wo)
-
New Haven, CT
- (wann)
-
2018
- DOI
-
doi:10.3982/TE2513
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Hernando-Veciana, Ángel
- Michelucci, Fabio
- The Econometric Society
Entstanden
- 2018
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Gridlock and inefficient policy instruments
Auctions vs. negotiations: The effects of inefficient renegotiation
Auctions vs. Negotiations: The Effects of Inefficient Renegotiation
Auctions versus negotiations: The effects of inefficient renegotiation
The Inflation Tax is Likely to be Inefficient at any Level
Vaccination Gap, Vaccination Fraud and Inefficient Testing: Lessons From the Coronavirus Pandemic
Inefficient continuation decisions, job creation costs, and the cost of business cycles
Inefficient redistribution and inefficient redistributive politics
Inefficient redistribution and inefficient redistributive politics
Inefficient redistribution and inefficient redistributive politics
Competing Combinatorial Auctions
Support for private research and development in OECD countries on the rise but increasingly inefficient
Gridlock and inefficient policy instruments
Auctions vs. negotiations: The effects of inefficient renegotiation
Auctions vs. Negotiations: The Effects of Inefficient Renegotiation
Auctions versus negotiations: The effects of inefficient renegotiation
The Inflation Tax is Likely to be Inefficient at any Level
Vaccination Gap, Vaccination Fraud and Inefficient Testing: Lessons From the Coronavirus Pandemic
Inefficient continuation decisions, job creation costs, and the cost of business cycles
Inefficient redistribution and inefficient redistributive politics
Inefficient redistribution and inefficient redistributive politics
Inefficient redistribution and inefficient redistributive politics
Competing Combinatorial Auctions
Support for private research and development in OECD countries on the rise but increasingly inefficient
Gridlock and inefficient policy instruments
Auctions vs. negotiations: The effects of inefficient renegotiation
Auctions vs. Negotiations: The Effects of Inefficient Renegotiation
Auctions versus negotiations: The effects of inefficient renegotiation
The Inflation Tax is Likely to be Inefficient at any Level
Vaccination Gap, Vaccination Fraud and Inefficient Testing: Lessons From the Coronavirus Pandemic
Inefficient continuation decisions, job creation costs, and the cost of business cycles
Inefficient redistribution and inefficient redistributive politics
Inefficient redistribution and inefficient redistributive politics
Inefficient redistribution and inefficient redistributive politics
Competing Combinatorial Auctions