Arbeitspapier
A Dynamic Theory of Secession
This paper builds a dynamic theory of secessions, conflictual or peaceful, analyzing the forward looking interaction between groups in a country. The proposed framework allows us to jointly address several key stylized facts on secession, and generates several novel predictions. We find that if a group out of power is small enough, then the group in power can always maintain peace with an acceptable offer of surplus sharing for every period, while when there is a mismatch between the relative size and the relative surplus contribution of the minority group, conflict followed by secession can occur. Accepted peaceful secession is predicted for large groups of similar prosperity, and higher patience is associated to a higher chance of secession. We formulate as a result a number of policy recommendations on various dimensions of federalism and other institutions.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 7257
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- Thema
-
secessions
conflict
surplus sharing
mismatch
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Esteban, Joan
Flamand, Sabine
Morelli, Massimo
Rohner, Dominic
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2018
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
01.03.2025, 22:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Esteban, Joan
- Flamand, Sabine
- Morelli, Massimo
- Rohner, Dominic
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2018