Arbeitspapier

Fragility of secured credit chains

We present a model of secured credit chains in which assets generated from intermediation activity and pledged as collateral create fragility. A dealer stands between a borrower and a financier. The dealer borrows from the financier to fund her project, subject to a moral hazard problem, In addition, the dealer can intermediate between the financier and the borrower, forming a credit chain. Intermediation profits can thus act as collateral for the loan to fund the dealer's own project. When these profits are risky, however, using them as collateral may undermine the dealer's incentives, generating fragility in the chain. The arrival of news about the value of the revenue of the intermediation activity further increases fragility. This fragility channel generates a premium for safe or opaque collateral. The environment considered in our model applies to various situations, such as trade credit chains, securitization and repo markets.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Discussion Papers ; No. 23-04

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Pension Funds; Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
Corporate Finance and Governance: General
Thema
Collateral
Secured Lending
Intermediation
Fragility

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Gottardi, Piero
Maurin, Vincent
Monnet, Cyril
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Bern, Department of Economics
(wo)
Bern
(wann)
2023

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ

Datenpartner

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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Gottardi, Piero
  • Maurin, Vincent
  • Monnet, Cyril
  • University of Bern, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2023

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