Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior

Arbeitspapier

We define generalized extensive-form games which allow for mutual unawareness of actions. We extend Pearce's (1984) notion of extensive-form (correlated) rationalizability to this setting, explore its properties and prove existence. We define also a new variant of this solution concept, prudent rationalizability, which refines the set of outcomes induced by extensive-form rationalizable strategies. Finally, we define the normal form of a generalized extensive-form game, and characterize in it extensive-form rationalizability by iterative conditional dominance.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper ; No. 09-10

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General ; Noncooperative Games ; Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• Subject: unawareness ; extensive-form games ; extensive-form rationalizability ; prudent rationalizability ; iterative conditional dominance

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Heifetz, Aviad ; Meier, Martin ; Schipper, Burkhard C.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of California, Department of Economics
• (where): Davis, CA
• (when): 2009

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/58384
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET