Fallen Sanctuary: A Higher-Order and Leakage-Resilient Rekeying Scheme

Abstract: This paper presents a provably secure, higher-order, and leakage-resilient (LR) rekeying scheme named LR Rekeying with Random oracle Repetition (LR4), along with a quantitative security evaluation methodology. Many existing LR primitives are based on a concept of leveled implementation, which still essentially require a leak-free sanctuary (i.e., differential power analysis (DPA)-resistant component(s)) for some parts. In addition, although several LR pseudorandom functions (PRFs) based on only bounded DPA-resistant components have been developed, their validity and effectiveness for rekeying usage still need to be determined. In contrast, LR4 is formally proven under a leakage model that captures the practical goal of side-channel attack (SCA) protection (e.g., masking with a practical order) and assumes no unbounded DPA-resistant sanctuary. This proof suggests that LR4 resists exponential invocations (up to the birthday bound of key size) without using any unbounded leak-free com.... https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/11253

Object Details

• Location: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
• Extent: Online-Ressource
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Fallen Sanctuary: A Higher-Order and Leakage-Resilient Rekeying Scheme ; volume:2024 ; number:1 ; year:2023 ; IACR transactions on cryptographic hardware and embedded systems ; 2024, Heft 1 (2023)

Contributors, Places and Time

• Creator: Ueno, Rei ; Homma, Naofumi ; Inoue, Akiko ; Minematsu, Kazuhiko

Further information

• DOI: 10.46586/tches.v2024.i1.264-308
• URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-2023120617555481474489
• Rights: Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
• Last update: 15.08.2025, 7:30 AM CEST